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Is The Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fee Discharged In Bankruptcy?
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code' offers relief to a debtor by delaying
collection activities of creditors2 and/or by discharging pre-bank-
ruptcy indebtedness for debtors.' The policy objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter the Code) are to give the debtor
a "fresh start" and to provide equity among the creditors.
4
These objectives conflict with other provisions in the Code that
do not discharge the debtor from government claims for unpaid
taxes and interest.5 As a result of this conflict, the debtor is not
relieved from tax liability and the unsecured governmental claims
are given priority. 6 Consequently, the federal government's need
to collect revenue for its orderly operation and for the provision
of public goods and services is a primary policy choice over the
debtor's need for a "fresh start.'"
' I1 U.S.C. § 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. 111). Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (98 Stat.) 576, added a new subsection (a)(5) to Section 507 and redesignated
existing subsections (a)(5) and (a)(6) as (a)(6) and (a)(7) respectively. Pub. L. No. 98-
353 did not amend cross-references to Section 507 to reflect the redesignations made in
that section. Throughout this Comment, cross-referenced sections are assumed to have
been amended to reflect the redesignations by Pub. L. No. 98-353.
II U.S.C. §§ 103, 362, 1301 (1982 & Supp. Ill).
II U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. Ill) (discharge for individual debtor in Chapter
7 liquidation); !1 U.S.C. § 1328 (discharge for individual debtor upon completion of
Chapter 13 Rehabilitation plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (discharge for debtor upon confir-
mation of Chapter II Reorganization plan). But see II U.S.C. § 523 (1982 & Supp. Ill)
(exceptions to discharge).
' COWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 13.1 (West 1983 Interim ed.); see S.
REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5793, 5799-800.
' II U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. I1). Section 523(a)(l)(A) states:
(a) A discharge under Section 727, 1141, or 1328
(b) .. . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(1) for a tax or a customs duty
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in Section 507(a)(2)
or 507(a)([71) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was
filed ....
See generally COWANS, supra note 4, at §§ 13.4, 13.5.
' See also Note, Denying an Implied Tax Lien Exception to the Federal Priority
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Realizing this inherent conflict within the Code, this Com-
ment will review the treatment of outstanding taxes in bank-
ruptcy through an analysis of whether the abandoned mine
reclamation fee, an obligation owing to the federal government
by coal mining operations,' is discharged in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Liability for unpaid or delinquent abandoned mine recla-
mation fees to the Abandoned Mine Reclamation fund9 is a
consideration for a coal company bordering on insolvency and
contemplating relief through bankruptcy. Since all coal mining
operators'0 are required to pay this quarterly fee," the charac-
terization of these payments and the accruing interest, the pur-
pose of the payments, the nature of the creditor, the location in
the list of priorities,' 2 and the nature of the conflicting policies
apparent in the Code'3 are issues which must be resolved in order
to provide some predictablity for the treatment of the operator's
assets.
In 1984, in U.S. v. River Coal Co.,' 4 the U.S. Court of
in Insolvency: Nesbitt v. United States, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 741, 748 (1984)(analyzing
United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29 (1832): priority of payment of debts
due to the government is necessary to assure "adequate revenue to discharge the debts
and obligations of the national government.").
" In order to rehabilitate abandoned mine lands, Congress established the Aban-
doned Mine Reclamation program in Title IV of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 101, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. I)) [hereinafter cited as SMCRA].
The abandoned mine reclamation fees are authorized at SMCRA § 403, 30 U.S.C. §
1232 (1982 & Supp. I).
The purpose of the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund is to restore disturbed
land to the pre-mining approximate original contour, to correct the adverse effects of
past coal mining on land and water resources, and to protect society and the environment
from the adverse effects of coal mine operation. SMCRA § 401, 30 U.S.C. § 1231 (1982
& Supp. 1); see also SMCRA §§ 101, 102, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1982 & Supp. I)
(detailing the policy objectives of the reclamation fund and fee).
I" SMCRA § 701(13), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) (1982 & Supp. 1); 30 C.F.R. § 870.11
(1985).
" SMCRA § 403(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(b) (requiring fees to be paid no later than
thirty days after the end of each calendar quarter occurring after August 3, 1977, and
ending fifteen years after August 3. 1977); see also SMCRA § 401, 30 U.S.C. § 1231
(establishing the fund).
'- 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 507 (1982 & Supp. 111); see infra notes 25 and 26 and
accompanying text.
" COWANS, supra note 4, at §§ 6.1, 6.2, 13.1. See generally, Scwartz, Security
Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
I (1981) (discussing the conflicting policy objectives provided in the Code for the debtor,
the federal government, and secured creditors).
" 748 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that courts should treat
these fees as taxes under the Bankruptcy Code. Treating the fees
as taxes would permit the government to recover the underlying
debt and any interest accruing on the unpaid amount. ' 6 In so
holding, the court joined a trend among the other circuits to
equate certain charges with taxes and to allow for the recovery
of post-petition interest.' 7
The decision by the court in River Coal Co. is limited,
however, because it applied a definition of a tax without func-
tionally analyzing the characteristics of the abandoned mine
reclamation fee. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit considered nei-
ther the revenue raising objective nor the debtor "fresh start"
policy in the context of the reclamation fee. The holding is also
limited by the statutory law under which it was decided.'"
This Comment analyzes whether the abandoned mine recla-
mation fee should be characterized as a tax in bankruptcy.
Before entering the analysis, a brief review of the tax priority
system created by the Bankruptcy Code is provided. Next, it
examines whether the abandoned mine reclamation fee should
be treated as a debt in bankruptcy. Finally, treatment of the fee
as a priority tax in bankruptcy is illustrated. While this Comment
agrees that the abandoned mine reclamation fee should be char-
acterized as a tax, it disagrees with the River Coal Co. court's
analysis and suggests an alternative. The Comment concludes by
suggesting that the resolution to the conflicting policies in the
Code with respect to the reclamation fee should be resolved in
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1107-08; see also U.S. v. King (In re King), 19 Bankr. 936, 938-39 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1982).
" River Coal Co., 748 F.2d at 1107; see In re Jaylaw Drug, Inc., 621 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1980); Hugh H. Eby Co. v. United States, 456 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1972);
see also Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964), aff'g, 317 F.2d 229 (9th Cir.
1963); Schafer v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 677 (D. Kan. 1972) (post-petition interest
is recoverable). But see City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949) (post-petition
interest is not recoverable); In re Vaughn, 292 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Ky. 1968) (post-
petition interest is not recoverable).
'8 The proceedings in River Coal Co. were instituted before November 6, 1978,
the date the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 took effect. The case was governed by I I
U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1976) stating that discharge in bankruptcy does not release a debtor
from "taxes which become legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States
... within three years preceding bankruptcy." This statutory language is similar to the
present policy in the Bankruptcy Code.
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favor of the superiority of the federal government's need to
maintain this type of revenue over the need for the debtor coal
company to be given a "fresh start."
I. THE TAX PRIORITY SYSTEM
Actions in bankruptcy proceedings instituted by the govern-
ment as an unsecured creditor of the debtor seek payment of
delinquent taxes as well as any accrued interest. 9 Federal tax
claims are given preferential treatment for payment out of the
property of the bankruptcy estate. 20 They are non-dischargeable
debts recoverable from the individual debtor irrespective of which
chapter in the Code is utilized for relief.
2'
This policy of preferential treatment for governmental claims
of unpaid taxes and interest conflicts with the general objectives
of the Code: (1) to give the individual debtor a "fresh start"
and (2) to provide equity among all the creditors.2 2 Recently, the
courts have adopted the government's position by allowing re-
covery of unpaid taxes plus pre-petition and post-petition inter-
est.23 Consequently, the need to maintain revenue collection takes
precedence over the debtor's need to have the debt discharged.
The Supreme Court gave one reason for this treatment in New
Jersey v. Anderson, stating that "taxes are imposts levied for
the support of government . . .operat[ing] in invitum" 2 4 and,
therefore, are non-dischargeable.
See, e.g., River Coal Co., 748 F.2d at 1103.
I" I U.S.C. §§ 726, 507 (1982 & Supp. Il1); see infra notes 25 and 26. See
generally Eckloff, Priority in Bankruptcy, 58 DEN. L.J. 279 (1981); Haines, Employers'
Workmen's Compensation Obligations and the Bankruptcy Tax Priority, 85 W. VA. L.
REV. 97 (1982).
2 A discharge under sections 727, 1141 or 1328(b) does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt for a tax... of the kind. in section 507(a)(2) or 507(aX7). II
U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 1i); see infra notes 25, 26 and 47 and accompanying
text. See generally Sheinfeld & Caldwell, Taxes: An Analysis of the Tax Provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 121-
22 (1981).
See supra notes 4, 7, and 13.
See supra note 16.
. 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906).
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Sections 72625 and 50726 are the operative sections of the
Code dealing with delinquent taxes. Section 726 requires that
the assets of the debtor's estate be distributed for payment of
Ii U.S.C. § 726(a) (1982 & Supp. 11). Section 726(a) states:
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate
shall be distributed-
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order
specified in, section 507 of this title;
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim, other than a
claim of a kind specified in paragraph (1), (3), or (4) of this subsection,
proof of which is-
(A) timely filed under section 501(a) of this title;
(B) timely filed under section 501(b) or 501(c) of this title; or
(C) tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title, if-
(i) the creditor that holds such a claim did not have notice or
actual knowledge of the case in time for timely filing of a proof of
such claim under section 501(a) of this title; and
(ii) proof of such claim is filed in time to permit payment of
such claim;
(3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim proof of which
is tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title, other than a claim of
the kind specified in paragraph (2XC) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or un-
secured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary,
or punitive damages, arising before the earlier of the order for relief
or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty,
forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss
suffered by the holder of such claim;
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date of the
filing of the petition, on any claim paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3),
or (4) of this subsection; and
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
21 II U.S.C. § 507(a) (1982 & Supp. Ill). Section 507 states:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(i) First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this
title, and any fees and charges assesssed against the estate . . .
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to
the extent that such claims are for-
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts-
(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing
of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including
extensions, after three years before the date of the filing of the
petition;
(ii) assessed within 240 days, plus any time plus 30 days during
which an offer in compromise with respect to such tax that was
made within 240 days after such assessment was pending, before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(iii) other than a tax of a kind specified in section 523(a)(l)(B)
or 523(a)(1)(c) of this title, not assessed before, but assessable, under
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the claims as follows: (1) "priority claims" under Section 507;27
(2) any timely filed or excusably late claim; (3) any tardily filed
claim; (4) a claim for a fine, penalty, or punitive damages; 28 (5)
post-petition interest payments on any claim previously paid;29
and (6) payment to the debtor.30
"Priority claims," the first class of claims to be paid from
the debtor's estate3" include seven kinds of claims which qualify,
in descending entitlement, for priority in distribution.32 First
priority is granted to administrative expenses and to "any fees
and charges assessed against the estate." '3 3 Administrative ex-
penses include the cost of preserving the estate, expenses of the
creditors, and any tax not specified as an unsecured governmen-
applicable law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the
case;
(B) a property tax assessed before the commencement of the case
and last payable without penalty after one year before the date of
the filing of the petition;
(C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the
debtor is liable in whatever capacity;
(D) an employment tax on a wage, salary, or commission. .. earned
from the debtor before the date of the filing of the petition
after three years before the date of the filing of the petition;
(E) an excise tax on-
(i) a transaction occurring before the date of the filing of the petition
for which a return . . . after three years before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(ii) if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the three
years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition;
(F) a customs duty arising out of the importation of merchandise
(G) a penalty related to a claim of a kind specified in this paragraph
and in compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
2" II U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (directs the payments out of the debtor's estate to the
various creditors). The first group of creditors' claims which are to be satisfied are those
listed under Section 507. See supra note 26.
2, Ii U.S.C. § 726(a)(2-4); see supra note 25.
1, II U.S.C. § 726(a)(5); see supra note 25. Post-petition interest is allowed to be
paid out of the debtor's estate if the debtor remains solvent after all the creditors' claims
have been satisfied. Cf. I t U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III) (disallowing unmatured
interest on claims). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. III) (debtor's
continuing liability for priority taxes) and Bruning, 376 U.S. 358 (requiring individual
debtor liability for pre-petition and post-petition interest).
II U.S.C. § 726(a)(b); see supra note 25.
See Scheinfeld & Caldwell, supra note 21, at 119-20.
' II U.S.C. § 726(a)(1-6).
I I U.S.C. § 726(a)(1); see supra note 25.
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tal tax claim.34 Unsecured claims of governmental units occupy
seventh priority." These claims include the tax measured by
income on gross receipts,3 6 property taxes,37 taxes required to be
withheld or collected by the debtor and for which the debtor is
liable in whatever capacity,38 employment taxes, 9 excise taxes,'
customs duties4' and penalties. 2 Depending on the nature of the
governmental obligation, the court will differentiate between a
first priority and a seventh priority allowance for taxes and treat
the obligation accordingly for payment from the remaining assets
of the debtor.
The cases that have analyzed what constitutes a tax for
purposes of the bankruptcy priority have relied on the pro bono
publico characteristic of the exaction.43 These courts have deter-
mined whether a particular governmental levy is a "tax" for
purposes of bankruptcy by examining its function, not by the
label which it is given." The Supreme Court has taken a broad
view of what constitutes a tax for purposes of the Code and has
concluded that "a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individ-
uals or property for the purpose of supporting the government
II U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A)-(B) (any tax incurred by the estate, except a claim
under § 507(a)(6) is allowed as an administrative expense).
" II U.S.C. § 507(a)(7); see supra note 26; Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43
(1974).
" 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A); see supra note 26.
I I U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(B); see supra note 26.
3 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(C) (a tax for which the debtor is liable in whatever
capacity, a "trust fund" tax, is recoverable as an unsecured governmental claim); see
supra note 26. See generally S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5854-59.
1II U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(D); see supra note 26.
- 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(E) (an excise tax which is due within three years to filing
of petition is recoverable as a governmental unsecured claim); see supra note 26.
II U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(F); see supra note 26.
I1 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(G); see supra note 26.
See U.S. v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1977); United States v. New York, 315 U.S.
510 (1942); In re Pan American Paper Mills, 618 F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1980); see also In
re Otto F. Lange Co., 159 F. 586, 588 (N.D. Iowa 1908) ("Many taxes are imposed
under the name of license fees, franchise taxes, or taxes for special purposes under some
other name, . . . they are nevertheless taxes imposed for a public purpose, no matter
what the name under which they are levied or imposed, and are clearly within the
meaning of the term 'tax' as used in the bankruptcy act.") See generally In re Sunset
Enterprises, Inc., 49 Bankr. 296 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985); In the Matter of C.M. & C.
Coal Co., 33 Bankr. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
See supra note 43.
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• ..or for a special purpose authorized by it. ' 41 Therefore, any
pecuniary obligation, regardless of the name it may be called, is
a tax for purposes of bankruptcy if it actually possesses the
characteristics of a tax.46 An assessment is non-dischargeable by
the individual debtor if it is in the nature of a tax 7.4 Accordingly,
the importance of the policy to raise revenues to maintain the
government and its activities is clearly evident in the judicial
opinions.
II. CHARACTERIZING THE ABANDONED MINE
RECLAMATION FEE
A. The U.S. v. River Coal Co. Approach
In U.S. v. River Coal Co., the Sixth Circuit labeled the
abandoned mine reclamation fee a tax." This court was not the
first to determine that the fees were taxes. 49 Each court, including
the Sixth Circuit, confronted with the characterization analyzed
and categorized the abandoned mine reclamation fee in terms of
the definitions of a true fee obligation and a true tax obligation.50
This distinction resurrected the definitions of fees and taxes
provided by the Supreme Court in National Cable Television
Assn. v. United States.5 In that case, the Court concluded that
" New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906); see also City of New York
v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 284-85 (1941); In re Beaman, 9 Bankr. 539, 540 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1980) (a tax for bankruptcy priority is a pecuniary burden for the purpose of
defraying the expenses of government or of undertakings authorized by it). See generally
Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); In re Ayala,
35 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
See supra notes 43 and 45.
' See supra note 5 (for text of statute). Although this section refers to individual
debtors, corporations and partnerships are not entitled to any discharge in liquidation
proceedings. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5793, 5884-86. See generally Coogan, A Debtor's Choice of
A "Chapter" Rehabilitation Proceeding Under the "Bankruptcy Act", I VT. L. REv.
117 (1976); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 727.01 (15th ed. 1985) (discharges granted to
individuals only negatively imply that partnerships and corporations do not receive
discharge of this indebtedness).
748 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984).
See In re C.M. & C. Coal Co., 33 Bankr. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); U.S.
v. King (In re King), 19 Bankr. 936 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
" See supra note 49.
" 415 U.S. 336, 340-43 (1974).
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an assessment for a public purpose is a tax which can only be
authorized by Congress. 2 According to the Court, if a public
agency extracts a charge which not only bestows a benefit on
the payor but also serves a public interest or policy, it is a tax."
Payment of a fee, by contrast, is no more than a "voluntary
act" or "a request that a public agency permit an applicant to
practice law or medicine or construct a house. . . ."I' Accord-
ingly, the Court surmised that a fee bestows an individual benefit
on the applicant, not on all of society." Therefore, if there is
only a value to the recipient, the charge is not a tax, it is a fee.
If the charge confers a benefit that serves the public good, it is
a tax.
By relying solely on an analysis of what constitutes a fee
and ignoring the tax policy and revenue policy apparent in the
bankruptcy tax priority cases, the Sixth Circuit in River Coal
Co. concluded that the abandoned mine reclamation fee is a
tax.16 The court's method of categorizing the abandoned mine
reclamation charge poses four problems. First, in basing their
characterization on the analysis in National Cable Television
Assn., the Sixth Circuit failed to recognize that the distinction
in that case was made in order to clarify the powers of public
agencies and to ensure that the taxation power is not broadly
delegated by Congress to agencies." In National Cable Television
Assn., the issue centered on a congressionally unauthorized charge
which possessed the essential characteristics of a tax. 8 The aban-
doned mine reclamation fee is a congressionally authorized as-
sessment enacted as part of Title IV of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 9 Therefore,
the issue should be whether Congress intended for the fee to be
a tax.
Second, this approach does not provide a useful classification
scheme because many fees do confer benefits on society. For
Id. at 341.
Id. at 340-42.
'I Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
River Coal Co., 748 F.2d at 1106. See Sunset Enterprises, 49 Bankr. 296; C.M.
& C. Coal Co., 33 Bankr. at 359; King, 19 Bankr. at 938.
7 National Cable Television Ass'n., 415 U.S. at 336.
Id.
"See supra notes 8 and 9.
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example, permits to practice law and medicine and to mine coal60
not only bestow benefits on the applicant, but serve the public
interest by informing the public that the lawyer, physician and
coal operator have met the regulatory requirements. When, for
example, mining permit fees are paid, a registry of approved coal
operators is created.6 ' Since these fees serve the public interest,
they could be classified as taxes under the analysis employed by
the River Coal Co. court even though they clearly are not taxes.
Therefore, a more limited definition of taxes is necessary in order
to exclude such assessments from being characterized as taxes.
Third, the Sixth Circuit fee approach in characterizing a
government assessment is problematic because of the attention
given the label for the assessment. Only after consideration of
the label did the Sixth Circuit determine whether the reclamation
fee is or is not a tax. 62 The Sixth Circuit ignored previous judicial
rulings that, for purposes of bankruptcy, the label given the
charge is unimportant. 6 The characteristics and the purposes of
the assessment should be determinative in characterizing a tax.
If it looks like a tax, it probably is a tax. Any discussion of the
definitions of fees or premiums6 and how they differ from taxes
borders on metaphysical rhetoric or, at least, arguments in se-
mantics when the subject is the discharge in bankruptcy of a
congressionally authorized assessment.
Fourth, the Sixth Circuit did not consider the conflicting
policies in the Code. A balancing approach is necessary to de-
termine whether the reclamation fee is the type of judicially
recognized and congressionally authorized revenue that takes
priority over the need for the debtor to have a "fresh start."
"I Every coal mine operator who seeks to extract coal from the earth must acquire
a permit and submit a detailed application with maps of the proposed site. See SMCRA
§ 507, 30 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982 & Supp. 1); see also 30 C.F.R. § 870.11 (1985); infra note
73.
See SMCRA § 507, 30 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982 & Supp. I).
': River Coal Co., 748 F.2d at 1106.
' See supra notes 43 and 45 and accompanying text.
In re Pan American, 618 F.2d 159 (holding that unpaid premiums to a state
workmen's compensation fund are "taxes" not discharged by bankruptcy in the meaning
of tax priority); see also In re International Automated Machines, Inc., 9 Bankr. 575
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); State Industrial Accident Commission v. Aebi, 162 P.2d 513
(Or. 1945).
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B. An Alternative Approach
Since the analysis in River Coal Co. does not provide a
framework which adequately distinguishes between government
assessments which are taxes and those which are not for purposes
of the Code, an alternative approach is warranted. The following
approach disregards the label and reviews the congressional in-
tent and the characteristics of the assessment to determine whether
or not it is a non-dischargeable tax. The first step in this analysis
is to determine whether or not Congress intended to create a tax
when it authorized the assessment. The second step, in the event
of an ambiguous Congressional intent, is to evaluate the assess-
ment in terms of the essential characteristics of taxes. Only by
studying the purpose, use, and authority for the charge can a
determination be made as to whether it is or is not a tax. 61
First, when Congress established the abandoned mine recla-
mation fee, it noted that a number of states have similar "re-
clamation fees or taxes on coal." 66 Cognizant of the similarity,
Congress equated the abandoned mine reclamation fee with taxes
and structured the assessment similarly. 67 These Congressional
determinations suggest that Congress intended to create a tax
when it established the abandoned mine land reclamation fee.
Second, Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution
grants Congress the "Power to lay and collect taxes . . . and to
provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States. ' 68 By
including the "general welfare" as a legitimate objective of
federal taxation, the drafters of the Constitution established one
criterion for determining whether or not an assessment is a tax.
The Supreme Court in National Cable Television Assn. recog-
nized that a tax is an exaction for public purposes, a charge for
the public benefit. 69 The Supreme Court recognized other char-
acteristics of taxes in New Jersey v. Anderson.70 In that case,
the Court stated that the characteristics to be considered in
determining that an assessment is a tax include whether the
C.M. & C. Coal, 33 Bankr. at 359.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 668.
I' id. at 668-69, 676-77, 730-32.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 341.
'" 203 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1906).
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charge is based on ability to pay, whether the amount is fixed
by statute, whether it is non-discriminatory and whether the
amount is capable of being enforced by a civil or criminal action
against the taxpayer.7'
The dominant objective of the Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fund is "the protection of public health, safety, general welfare,
and property from extreme danger of adverse effects of coal
mining practices .... "72 The benefits of reclamation are for the
general public. When compared to the foremost quality of a tax,
an assessment for the general welfare, this mandatory contri-
bution to the fund appears to be a tax. The reclamation fee is
a source of revenue for a federal government activity that re-
stores the physical environment which was damaged by past
mining operations.
The reclamation fee is not a static charge, nor does it dis-
criminate. It is levied on every coal mining operation 73 and is
assessed according to the tonnage of coal mined during a
quarter. 74 The more coal mined, the greater the fee. An "acces-
" Id.; see also Yosemite Park and Curry Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 925, 930
(Ct. Cl. 1982); In re Smith Atlantic Packers Ass'n, 28 Bankr. 80 (Bankr. D.C. S.C.
1983) (elements characterizing "tax" are (I) involuntary pecuniary obligations regardless
of name, laid upon individuals or property, (2) imposed by, or under authority of
legislature, (3) for purposes including defraying government expenses or undertakings,
and (4) under police or taxing power of state).
7 SMCRA § 403(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1233(1) (1982 & Supp. I); see also SMCRA §
401(c)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1). See generally 30 C.F.R. § 870 (1985);
H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., ist Sess. reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD
NEWS 593, 700.
" 30 C.F.R. § 870.11 (1985) states:
The regulations ... apply to all surface and underground coal mining
operations except-(emphasis added)-
(a) The extraction of coal by a landowner for his own noncommercial
use from land owned or leased by him;
(b) The extraction of coal for commercial purposes by surface coal
mining oerations which affects two acres or less during the life of the
mine;
(c) The extraction of coal as an incidental part of Federal, State or
local government-financed highway or other construction;
(d) The extraction of coal incidental to the extraction of other minerals
where coal does not exceed 16 2/3 percent of the mineral tonnage
removed for commercial use or sale in any twelve consecutive months;
and
(e) The extraction of less than 250 tons of coal within 12 consecutive
months.
See SMCRA § 402(a)-(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. I) (requiring
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sion to coal" necessitates a higher assessed fee much like an
"accession to wealth" 75 necessitates the imposition of greater
income taxes. This is probably the most distinguishing charac-
teristic of a tax. At this point, for example, permit fees fail to
qualify as taxes. Moreover, if the coal company fails to pay the
reclamation fee, interest accumulates on the unpaid amount.
76
The coal company that fails to make payments is subject to a
civil suit for the payments and interest 77 whereas an attempt to
evade an income tax necessitates criminal proceedings."'
There is some judicial support for this method of analysis.
In In re James E. King, the first case to address whether the
reclamation fee is a tax for purposes of bankruptcy, the fee was
analyzed in terms of whether or not the assessment was a tax.
79
Nomenclature was not at issue; the tax characteristics of the
abandoned mine reclamation fee were the deciding factors and
the National Cable Television Assn. decision was used to distin-
guish taxes.A0 The court concluded that the abandoned mine
reclamation fee was designed to be a pecuniary burden for the
purposes of defraying governmental expenses, and for funding
a special land reclamation program, authorized by Title II of
SMCRA.8 The King court determined that the reclamation fee
is a tax by relying on the broad definitions and characteristics
of taxes traditionally used by the courts to define a tax in
bankruptcy.
8 2
If Congressional intent and the structure of the assessment
indicate that the reclamation fee is a tax, it should be treated as
a varying fee to be assessed on the tonnage of coal mined depending on whether it is
produced above ground or underground, with an exception for lignite).
" Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), reh'g denied 349
U.S. 925 (1955).
' River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1106-08.
SMCRA § 402(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(e) (1982 & Supp. 1).
See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982 & Supp. 111).
7' King, 19 Bankr. 936.
Id. at 938-39.
Id. at 939; see also Feiring, 313 U.S. at 284-85; Beaman, 9 Bankr. 539.
King at 939. See generally supra notes 35, 36 & 63 and accompanying text. The
court in King and River Coal Co. apparently disregarded any significance attached to
the fact that the reclamation fee is paid to the Secretary of the Interior for distribution
to the abandoned mine reclamation program rather than being paid to the Internal
Revenue Service as are most taxes. This characteristic of taxes presumably is insignificant.
See generally SMCRA §§ 401, 402, II U.S.C. §§ 1231, 1232.
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a tax for purposes of bankruptcy and no other question should
be entertained. This line of reasoning is far more streamlined
and sensible than the River Coal Co. approach and has judicial
support as it recognizes the necessity to maintain revenues to
fund government activities.83
III. TAX PRIORITY FOR THE FEE
In each case characterizing the reclamation fee, the discussion
and subsequent characterization of the fee was prompted because
the fee was unpaid at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed
and because the government wanted to collect fees past due .
4
In each case, the courts held that the fee was a non-dischargeable
debt and was to be paid by the debtor to the government.
Consequently, revenue raising for the general welfare, for the
environment, and for the restoration of mined lands was a
superior objective to those of giving the debtor a "fresh start"
and maintaining equity among creditors. The priority of revenue
raising is also evident when reviewing the issues of whether pre-
petition interest on unpaid abandoned mine reclamation fees can
be recovered by the federal government and whether the post-
petition interest can be collected on pre-petition fees.
A. Recovery of Pre-Petition Fees and Interest
As a federal tax which remains unpaid and owing prior to
filing a petition in bankruptcy, the abandoned mine reclamation
fee becomes a part of the bankruptcy tax priority scheme as an
unsecured governmental claim.85 In King, the unpaid abandoned
mine reclamation fee which remained unpaid prior to filing the
bankruptcy petition was characterized as an excise tax. 6 In so
characterizing, the Bankruptcy Court recognized the broad def-
inition that historically has been given excise taxes.87 The Su-
" See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
" River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103; Sunset Enterprises, 49 Bankr. 296; C.M. & C.
Coal Co., 33 Bankr. 358; King 19 Bankr. 936.
" II U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 11); see supra notes 26, 35-42 and
accompanying text.
King, 19 Bankr. at 939; see also I I U.S.C. § 507(a)(7XE); supra note 40.
King, 19 Bankr. at 939; see also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937) (an excise tax is not'a direct tax); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136
(1929); Beaman, 9 Bankr. 539, 541; American Life and Accident Ins. v. Love, 431
S.W.2d 177, 181 (Mo. 1968).
AMR FEE DIscHARGE
preme Court in Bromley v. McCaughn held that "[a] tax imposed
upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single
power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise (tax). "8
In King the court determined that the removal of coal from the
land is a tax on a particular use of property and that the "fee
may reasonably be regarded as a tax for ... mining coal." 8 9
Since it is characterized as an excise tax, the pre-petition debt
as a priority tax is non-dischargeable. 90
Debtors remain liable for pre-petition, non-dischargeable taxes
and interest not paid by the bankruptcy estate. 9' In Bruning v.
United States, the Supreme Court stated that interest is an
integral part of the tax debt. 92 Later, in United States v. Friend-
ship College, the Fourth Circuit decided that the interest on a
tax should not be treated differently than the tax. 93 This court
concluded that "[tlo treat interest inconsistently from taxes . . .
would require proof that such different treatment was intended
by the Code." 94 Therefore, bankruptcy tax priority claims do
include any interest that accrued on the claim before the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed. To the extent the underlying claim for
the reclamation fee is allowed, interest that has matured pre-
petition is a proper part of the claim.
B. Recovery of Post-Petition Interest on Pre-Petition Fees
In River Coal Co., the court concluded that interest which
accrued after the date of filing the petition was recoverable from
Bromley, 280 U.S. at 136.
King, 19 Bankr. at 939.
See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5854-5859 (Section 507(a)(7)(B) captures "trust fund" taxes,
income taxes . . . which are required to be withheld from an employee); see also I I
U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. IlI); supra note 5. But cf. Sunset Enterprises, 49
Bankr. at 297 (determining the reclamation fee to be a tax "required to be collected or
witheld and for which the debtor is liable for in whatever capacity" under II U.S.C. §
507(a)(7XB)).
11 Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964), aff'g 317 F.2d 229 (9th Cir.
1963).
Id. at 360. See generally COWANS, supra note 4, at § 13.5.
' 737 F.2d 430, 431 (4th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 433; see also In re Coleman American Cos., 26 Bankr. 825 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1983). See generally S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5859 (legislative history suggests that interest is
inseparable from the underlying debt in Section 507(a)(7)).
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the coal company debtor. 95 This decision followed a long line of
cases which held that debtors are liable for post-petition interest
on non-dischargeable tax claims. 96 Debtors become personally
liable for pre-petition interest only if the interest cannot be paid
out of the bankruptcy estate.
97
Any interest which matures on the underlying debt post-
petition is incurred by the estate and is characterized as admin-
istrative expenses. 9 In In re Jartran Inc., the Seventh Circuit
demonstrated that the timing of an obligation, whether it occurs
pre-petition or post-petition, is crucial in prioritizing it.99 Con-
sequently, a post-petition interest claim is a first priority admin-
istrative debt'°° whereas a pre-petition interest claim is a seventh
priority debt,'10  and both are non-dischargeable.'0 2 Some courts
have characterized the post-petition interest which accrues on a
pre-petition debt as non-dischargeable because of the underlying
obligation. 103 The abandoned mine reclamation fee is a non-
dischargeable debt and any interest accruing pre-petition or post-
petition on that debt is non-dischargeable.
CONCLUSION
Once the reclamation fee is correctly analyzed as a tax, its
treatment under the Code is predictable. The individual debtors
are not discharged from tax claims of the federal government.
The abandoned mine reclamation fee, being characterized as this
type of priority tax, is not discharged in bankruptcy. The courts
also have taken the position of the government in allowing
recovery of the interest on the fee, pre-petition and post-petition.
Although the characterization of the reclamation fee as a tax
" River Coal Co., 748 F.2d at 1108. See generally Note, Post-Petition Interest
on Tax Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 36 TAx LAWYER 793 (1982-83).
- See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
"' II U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IIl); see supra notes 25, 29 and accompa-
nying text.
" 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. III); see also supra notes 33, 34 and
accompanying text.
732 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1984).
*" 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 111).
-0 Id.
102 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A); see also 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(G).
103 Sunset Enterprises, 49 Bankr. at 296; see also Friendship College, 737 F.2d 430
(interest on priority taxes should receive first priority treatment); supra note 17.
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for purposes of bankruptcy is proper, the analysis employed in
River Coal Co., does not clarify whether or not the fee is a tax.
This Comment has offered an alternative two-pronged analysis.
The first step is to review the legislative intent for the fee and
to determine whether or not Congress intended to create a tax.
The second step is to review the constitutionally created and
judicially recognized characteristics of taxes to determine whether
or not the fee is a tax. Finally, any analysis must acknowledge
the superiority of the revenue-producing objective of the Code
to the policies of "fresh start" and equity among creditors. In
this case, a revenue and expenditure policy choice is made:
raising revenue to restore the environment is more important
than giving the debtor a "fresh start."
ANN M. CATINO

